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FREEDOM, REPENTANCE AND HARDENING OF
THE HEARTS: ALBO VS. MAIMONIDES
David Shatz

The doctrine that God hardens some agents' hearts generates philosophical
perplexities. Why would God deprive someone of free will and the opportunity to repent? Or is God's interference compatible with the agent's free
will and his having an opportunity to repent? In this paper, I examine how
two Jewish philosophers, Moses Maimonides and Joseph Albo, handled
these questions. I analyze six approaches growing out of their writings and
argue that a naturalistic interpretation of hardening - as irreversible habituation - has advantages over alternative approaches. This account of
hardening, however, fits best with the thesis that God does sometimes
intervene to improve an agent's will.

When philosophers debate whether free will and moral responsibility are
compatible with determinism, their discussion rivets on two kinds of challenges to free will: divine foreknowledge and scientific determinism.
Although intense controversy rages over whether these factors are compatible with free will and responsibility, some version of the following thesis
is nonetheless usually accepted by all sides: that, when an agent S interferes directly to affect agent V's motivational system in a way that does not
involve rational persuasion (brainwashing, hypnosis, and the like), such
interference will normally preclude V's freely performing and bearing
responsibility for acts that the intervention caused. But traditional theism,
including Judaism in particular, seems to allow that at times God does
interfere directly with people's motivations. Is God's interference compatible with the agent's free will and moral responsibility? If it is not compatible, why would God deprive someone of free will and moral responsibility? Or does God not really interfere after all? In what follows, I consider
these questions from the perspective of Jewish philosophy.!
Two theological doctrines suggest- in an especially vivid way- that
God interferes in people's motivational systems in a problematic fashion.
One is hardening of the hearts. The other, for which Judaism has no convenient name, is what Christians call sanctification and, in the context of
Jewish philosophy, I will call "betterment."2
In hardening of the hearts God makes a person will a wicked act; in
''betterment,'' He makes the person will good acts. The showcase example
of heart-hardening occurs during the Israelites' enslavement in Egypt. In
three instances- the sixth, eighth and ninth of the ten plagues- we read
words to the effect that "The Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and [sol
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he did not let the people [of Israel] go." God also says that when Moses
will warn the king of the impending death of the Egyptians' firstborn, He
will cause Pharoah not to listen. During the final plague, Pharoah finally
relents and releases the Israelites. But shortly after that, his heart is hardened again, and he decides to pursue the Israelites into the sea. 3 Likewise,
the Moabite king Sihon is "hardened" by God to be hostile to Israel in
order that he be delivered into Israel's hands; later, the same kind of story
is related about the army of Canaan in the time of Joshua. 4 (Proverbs 21:1
informs us that "the heart of a king is in the Lord's hands like streams of
water; He will turn it to whatever He wants."S) Without referring to hardening per se, the prophet Elijah insinuates that God has led the hearts of
the sinning Israelites astray.6 But how can free will and moral responsibility for hardened acts coexist with determination of one's will by another
agent? Or are we to say Pharaoh and Sihon, for example, lacked free will
and incurred no moral responsibility for their hardened acts?
Similarly with sanctification or betterment: Deuteronomy 30:6 promises
that God will "circumcise the hearts of you and your descendants."
Ostensibly what is meant is that God will remove your inclination for evil.
Again, God tells Ezekiel that He will give the people a "new heart" and
"new spirit" and will remove their "heart of stone" (Ezek. 36:26). The
Hebrew prayerbook includes a plea to "compel our evil inclination to be
subjugated to You." But can sanctified (''bettered'') agents be thought of as
free and responsible?
At times, Jewish philosophers, fearing that hardening as ordinarily
understood is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility, have
gone to considerable exegetical lengths to deny that the term "hardening
the heart" has anything to do with intervention in motivational systems.
The phrase has been interpreted variously to connote, for example, providing respite or keeping someone alive, thereby preserving the compatibility
of hardening with freedom and moral responsibility.' But these expedients
are necessary only if, in addition to embracing the proposition that hardening as ordinarily understood is incompatible with free will and moral
responsibility, one embraces the thesis of Saadya Gaon (882-942), the father
of medieval Jewish philosophy, "that the Creator... does not in any way
interfere with the actions of men and that He does not exercise any force
upon them either to obey or disobey Him."B There are Jewish philosophers
who do not endorse Saadya's no-intervention thesis, and I focus here on
two of them: Moses Maimonides (1138-1204), the greatest and most authoritative of Jewish philosophers, and the later Spanish philosopher Joseph
Albo (ca. 1380-1444).9
Each of these philosophers generates more than one approach to the
problem of hardening. In all we will consider six proposals. Two are stimulated by reading Albo: separating them somewhat artificially, in a way he
does not, I will call them the modest and the bold claims. Two are explicit
in Maimonides: hardening as punishment by free will deprivation; and
hardening as punishment by repentance deprivation. Finally, two others,
while not explicit in Maimonides, grow out of certain general tendencies in
his thought and are at least loosely related to some of his statements about
hardening. These are: hardening as God carrying out the agent's real choic-
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es; hardening as irreversible habituation. Of these six, the last differs by
virtue of its understanding hardening naturalistically- God does not
directly intervene in the hardened agent's motivational makeup after all,
though in some sense, as we shall see, the hardening is imputable to Him
(He is the first cause, or the source of nature's laws, including psychological ones). I will locate difficulties in the other five strategies, and the resulting conclusion that the sixth is strongest philosophically is of some significance. I will try to meet certain textual objections that can be raised to this
solution, and then will connect the naturalistic approach to hardening to
the question of how best to understand betterment. Throughout the paper I
assume that a "solution" to the hardening and betterment problems must
satisfy two criteria. It must be philosophically cogent; but it also must be
compatible with, if not directly supported by, the Bible's narrative and terminology. (Albo and Maimonides say much about hardening and little
about betterment. I will follow them in this emphasis, but at a later stage
we will pause to see how their claims work vis-a-vis betterment. IO)
Before proceeding we should be alert to the fact that Alba's strategy and
Maimonides' first two strategies differ in a profound and fundamental
way. To put matters roughly, Maimonides, in his "explicit," "exoteric"
statements, is an "H-incompatibilist." He thinks that, when God hardens
an agent's heart, that agent does not act freely and does not bear responsibility for his or her hardened acts. Consequently his "exoteric" approaches
see the hardening as eliminating Pharaoh's free will and responsibility, and
his analyses labor to explain why God would do such a thing. Albo, on the
other hand, is a compatibilist about hardening: he thinks that when God
hardens an agent's heart, that agent acts with freedom and responsibility.
As a result, Albo views the hardening as restoring, not eliminating, the
hardened agent's freedom. To be sure, the contrast just set out is somewhat
deceptive, since Maimonides and Albo do not conceive the process of hardening in the same way; Albo might think (and I believe does think) that
free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with hardening as
Maimonides conceives it, while Maimonides might think (though I doubt
this) that free will and moral responsibility are compatible with hardening
as Albo conceives it. But for all that the strategies are sharply different. By
contrast, the final two solutions we will consider in connection with
Maimonides (the inexplicit, esoteric ones) do not deny the compatibility of
hardening and responsibility but instead affirm it. 11

1. The problems
Before looking at Albo and Maimonides, we need to define more precisely the problems that hardening and betterment pose. "The problem of
hardening" is usually formulated as a problem of free will deprivation: If
God causes Pharaoh to will an evil act, namely, keeping the Israelites
enslaved, has God not deprived a human being of free will? And isn't free
will a great good? Now this particular problem depends on a judgment
about the value of free will; for that reason, it emerges most forcefully in
theological belief systems that explain evil in terms of a free will theodicy,
in which suffering and wrongdoing are justified by the "greater good" of
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free will and responsible moral choices. 12 It is not clear, however, that
Jewish philosophers are wedded to a free will theodicy, and in fact, some
Jewish texts suggest that free will per se is not as great a value as free will
theodicies imply. For example, authoritative Jewish sources at times justify
coercion, and this casts doubt on the proposition that the value of free will
outweighs the disvalue of bad behavior. When the biblical God tries to
secure obedience to His commands by promising rewards for compliance
and threatening dire punishments for disobedience, this, too, undermines
the value of free will, since it is a form of coercion. There are also doctrines
in Jewish thought to the effect that having free choice is not as good a state
as doing right automatically.I3 Hence the free will deprivation problem
rests on a premise about the value of free will that may not hold true in
Judaism. 14 It is one thing to affirm the existence of free will, another to say
that God never exerts compulsion or influence on motivation. If it is not
required of God to preserve all human free choices in all situations, the free
will deprivation problem will barely get off the ground, at least when the
deprivation serves a purpose. IS H-compatibilism need not be sought, nor
the expedient of denying that hardening signifies divine intervention.
But the conundrum of hardening does not disappear so quickly. First of
all, some philosophers, among them Saadya and Maimonides, and I suspect Albo too, have to address hardening precisely because they value free
choice highly; regardless of how much value other sources in Judaism
assign to free will, the problem of free will deprivation emerges fully and
forcefully for those philosophers. Second, the purpose of hardening has to be
spelled out even in the absence of a specific problem; there is a difference,
to which I shall return, between defending God (by saying He didn't do
anything objectionable by depriving someone of free will) and explaining
His motivations. Third, disposing of the free will deprivation problem by
altering our value judgments about free will still leaves us with three other
difficulties:

The responsibility problem: If God causes Pharaoh to will an evil act,
namely, keeping the Israelites enslaved, why should Pharaoh be held
responsible for this act?
The repentance-prevention problem: If God wants sinners to repent, as
Judaism preaches, why would God prevent any individual from
changing his ways for the better?
The causation problem: If God causes Pharaoh to will an evil act, namely, keeping the Israelites enslaved, has God not (a) caused an evil act,
(b) made a person morally worse, and (c) caused further suffering to
the Israelites and Egyptians?
All of these problems are formidable even if we are not troubled by God's
taking away free will. The Jewish philosophers we shall discuss are concerned with responsibility and repentance, not only free will deprivation. 16
Furthermore, repentance, on many accounts, must be a free act. Even
though, taken in isolation, the free will deprivation problem might be
solved by demoting the value of free will, to concede that Pharaoh lacks
free will is also to concede, prima facie, that God deprived him of the pos-
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sibility for repentance. So it is not only the strong statements of Saadya and
Maimonides affirming free will that create the difficulty about hardening.
(With regard to betterment, the key problem is of course free will deprivation and moral responsibility; the repentance issue does not apply.)

2. Albo's two claims: summary
Although Maimonides lived a few centuries before Albo, I will look first
at Albo's solution. Here are Albo's words:
In this way we can explain what is found in Scripture: that the Lord
strengthens the hearts of evil persons, or makes them stiff-necked,
and withholds from them the ways of repentance. When adversity
comes upon the evildoer he becomes pious-looking and returns to
the Lord from the fear of punishment. As Pharaoh stated, 'The Lord
is the righteous one; I and my people are the wicked ones" [Exodus
9:27] .... And because this [his act] is like one that is compelled
rather than free, the Lord strengthens His heart. .. and therefore he
says that this adversity came by accident and not because of divine
providence. This is done in order to remove from his heart the softness it acquired because of the adversity, so that the person will
remain in his natural state and his state of choice without anything
compelling him, and then it may be determined whether his repentance was an instance of free choice.... The Lord leaves [the evildoer] to his free choice without any external compulsion, and he chooses a path for himself.'?
We may distinguish two claims in Albo's text, which he melds into one
unified strategy.'" The first claim is that had God not hardened Pharaoh's
heart, and Pharaoh would have therefore released the Israelites due to the
mounting pressure of the plagues, this would not have been a free choice
on Pharaoh's part anyway and would not have constituted repentance;
rather, the decision to release would then have been coerced. According to
this claim taken by itself (i.e., without the rest of what Albo says),
Pharaoh's actual act of keeping the Israelites enslaved (the "hardened" act)
may be unfree due to its being caused by God's intervention, but the
charge that God has "deprived" Pharaoh of free will is false, since Pharaoh
is not less free than if God had not intervened. Also, Pharaoh would not
have genuinely repented had he succumbed to the plagues' pressure.
We may call this the "modest" claim. The modest claim is content to
affirm a parity between the status of Pharaoh's "hardened" act and the status of the act he would have performed had his heart not been hardened.
The modest claim does not try to show, however, that the hardened act is
free. The modest claim therefore is not a form of H-compatibilism, but
rather can go along with an incompatibilist view of hardening.
However, Albo's second claim takes precisely this step: to claim that,
despite its being produced by God's intervention, Pharaoh's act of keeping
the Israelites enslaved is free. The key here is Albo's depiction of the
"mechanics" of hardening. Albo believes that when God "hardens"
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Pharaoh's heart, this means merely that he strengthens Pharaoh's heart, giving him the fortitude not to let the plagues automatically dictate a decision
to release the Israelites. Pharaoh, in Albo's story, is- thanks to the hardening - left with a choice: whether to release the Israelites or to keep them
enslaved. It is the existence of this choice that makes his act of keeping
them enslaved a free act; he has open to him a genuine alternative, namely,
to release them. And it is this same choice that means he has a possibility to
repent. His ultimate failure to release the Israelites is free, then, because
Pharaoh chooses between two alternatives and neither alternative is
coerced. Albo is not a strong H-compatibilist: hardening in the straightforward sense of God imposing a motivational structure is not compatible
with freedom. But Albo is an H-compatibilist in the sense that hardening as
he explains it - the unsolicited removal by another agent of certain psychological impediments like fears and internal pressures, resulting in bad
acts- is compatible with free will and moral responsibility. I shall refer to
the claim that the hardened act is free and responsible as the "bold" claim. 19
It might seem as if trying to combine the modest and bold claims gives
the theist unnnecessary work. Aren't the problems solved by using either
claim? Is it really necessary to establish both? The answer is somewhat
complicated. Suppose we paraphrase the modest claim as:
(M) If God had not hardened Pharaoh's heart, and Pharaoh would
have released the Israelites because of the pressure of the plagues,
Pharaoh's release of them would have been unfree.
Next let us paraphrase the bold claim as:
(B) By hardening Pharaoh's heart, God brought about a situation in
which Pharaoh freely chose to keep the Israelites enslaved and had a
chance to repent.
Now suppose a theist were to adopt (M) without (B). A critic might then
respond to the theist, "but by hardening Pharaoh's heart, God brought it
about that he acted unfreely anyway. So (M) does not explain why God
hardened Pharaoh's heart. It shows only that the hardening did not
'deprive' the king of freedom (he would have acted unfreely had he
released them). And it did not 'deprive' him of the possibility of repenting,
since his 'repentance' would not have been real repentance anyway. (M) is
a defense of God against the charge that he has taken away someone's free
will; it is not an explanation of His ways." Once we supplement (M) with
(B), however, a reply to this concern is at hand: we may explain that God
hardened Pharaoh's heart in order to ensure that Pharaoh acted freely and
had a chance to repent. Adding (B) to (M), in other words, provides an
explanation and not merely a defense.
Similarly, suppose someone were to adopt (B) without (M). A critic might
then respond to such a theist, ''but hardening Pharaoh's heart was not needed in order to bring it about that Pharaoh acted freely and had a chance to
repent. Had God not hardened Pharaoh's heart, and he would have released
the Israelites, this too would have been a free act and would have constituted
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repentance. So (B) does not explain why God hardened Pharaoh's heart. It
shows only that the hardening did not make the king act unfreely and
deprive him of a chance to repent." Once we supplement (B) with (M), we
may explain that God hardened Pharaoh's heart in order to ensure that
Pharaoh acted freely and had a chance to repent, thus answering the critic. 2n
Once a theist adopts both (B) and (M), then, he may claim that God hardened Pharaoh's heart precisely in order to ensure Pharaoh's free will
and/ or the possibility of repentance. So, conjoining (M) with (B) may be
necessary if the theist wants an explanation of hardening and not merely a
defense. And yet, it still may be unnecessary work on the theist's part, for
there are other possible reasons for God's hardening of Pharaoh's heart.
Several times, the Bible implies that God hardened Pharaoh's heart
because by continuing the plagues God enhanced His power in the eyes of
Egyptians and Israelites alike, leading them to flknowledge" of Him. To
instill that knowledge, it was necessary for him to manifest His power over
sea, earth, and heaven fully, and that required that the plagues run their
full course. 21 If that explanation is correct, then the theist does not need both
(M) and (B) to construct an explanation of the hardening. On the other
hand, it should be noted that some interpreters think that God meant to
enhance his glory by Pharaoh's eventually repenting. 22 Hence whether (M)
and (B) are both necessary depends on how one understands the motive
behind the hardening.
In sum, a theist needs only one of the two claims- modest or bold- to
construct a defense; but he will have an explanation only if he either (a) establishes both the modest and the bold claim, or (b) if he accepts the flgreater
manifestation of power" account of why God hardened the heart.
Unfortunately, both the modest and the bold claims, as we have explained
them, are open to challenge.

3. Albo's modest claim: coercion and free will
Consider first the modest claim. The modest claim supposes that an act
performed in the presence of coercive incentives is not free. Consider, however, the condition that traditional compatibilists (not H-compatibilists)
impose on free will: an agent does as he wants and because he wants it;
also, he would do otherwise if he wanted to do otherwise. Now a coerced
agent does as he wants and because he wants it; also, he would do otherwise if he wanted to do otherwise. On a simple compatibilist analysis,
therefore, a coerced act is free, and had Pharaoh released the Israelites, this
would have counted as a free act- contrary to Alba.
To be sure, Alba need not accept the compatibiIist's analysis. He might
even join with those who object to compatibilism precisely because it
ostensibly carries the consequence that coerced acts are free. But Bernard
Williams raises the following more general argument for treating coerced
acts as free:
If we are not to count as exercising freewill in cases of this kind [cases
of coercion], then we never exercise it, since all choices operate in a
space of alternatives constrained by the cost of various possibilities. 23
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If a road you wish to take is blocked by some nonhuman danger (e.g.,

steadily falling rocks), and you therefore choose another road, we regard
your choice as free. If a road you wish to take is blocked not by a rockslide
but by a gunman who threatens to shoot you if you pass through, and as a
result you must take another road, why should we treat this any differently?24 So wonder Williams and others: after all, in both cases, the option of
taking the other road exists, it is just too costly- it has been rendered
"ineligible."2s Williams' argument challenges Alba to differentiate cases of
coercion, which he regards as unfree, from other cases in which only one
option is reasonable for an agent yet the agent acts freely.>6 Until that is
done, plainly the modest claim is not completely successfulY
Even supposing that coerced acts are unfree, however, we may differentiate between coercion, in which a person has only one "eligible alternative"
and nothing else is an "eligible alternative" for him, and duress, in which a
person has two eligible alternatives but feels pressured by other agents into
accepting one of them. Since a person has eligible alternative possibilities
when acting under duress, arguably an act done out of duress is a free act
even if a coerced act is not. Now according to the modest claim, had
Pharaoh released the Israelites because of the plagues, this would have
been an unfree act because it would have been coerced. But can it not be
regarded as an act performed under duress, in the special sense of duress
that I outlined? Recall that Pharaoh had showed great strength of will in
not releasing the Israelites during the first five plagues, and also that in
some of the later plagues, he hardens his own heart, without divine assistance. 28 It is hard to believe that, even though he defies intimidation on his
own on both earlier and later occasions, Pharaoh could not have chosen to
keep the Israelites enslaved after the sixth, eighth, and ninth plagues.
Rather, at most we can say that he merely would not have so chosen if not
for the hardening. 29 If Pharaoh had eligible alternative possibilities, as I am
suggesting, then releasing the Israelites due to the plagues would have
been not a coerced act but an act under duress, and Albo should regard it
as free. It would have come at a cost that Pharaoh would be willing to pay,
and thinks he ought to pay, to avert further devastation, even though he
also recognizes reasons for keeping the Israelites as slaves.3o
4. Albo's modest claim (continued): levels of repentance

Alba claims that had Pharaoh released the Israelites under pressure of
the plagues, this would not have qualified as an act of repentance. But the
Talmud distinguishes between repentance out of fear (teshuvah mi-ljir'ah)
and repentance out of love (teshuvah me-ahavah).31 Interpreters differ over
details of this distinction, but there is general agreement that repentance
out of fear is repentance due to fear of punishment, while repentance out
of love is motivated by something higher, for example, a recognition of the
inherent wrongness of one's past deeds and a commitment to living rightly
in the future for the right reason: love of God. Repentance out of fear is a
level of repentance, albeit a low one. Had Pharaoh chosen to release the
Israelites due to pressure of the plagues, this would have constituted a
form of repentance. Alba therefore cannot claim that Pharaoh would not be
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repenting at all were he to release the Israelites due to pressure of the
plagues, but only that he would not be repenting out of love. It is hard to see
why God must go so far as to make repentance out of love possible for
Pharaoh. Albo thus seems to place excessively strict constraints on repentance, ignoring the fear\ love distinction. In fact, insofar as it is natural to
assume that an act of repentance is free, the fact that the release under pressure would have constituted an act of repentance validates the earlier
charge that the release under pressure would have been free rather than
unfree.
Fortunately, Albo himself raises the question of why Pharaoh could not
attain the level of repentance from fear by releasing the Israelites due to
pressure of the plagues. He argues, by way of response, that there is a distinction between "repentance out of fear" and the situation in which
Pharaoh found himself, a situation he characterizes as "ones" (coercion or
duress). As Albo describes repentance from fear, "even in a time of respite,
the fear of God is before him, and he has fear and trepidation due to anxiety over his tribulations because he believes that these all come from God
as retribution and punishment [as opposed to chance]." "Repentance out
of fear" is repentance due to an abiding, stable fear of punishment, based on
a continuing recognition of God's power. So, for example, if Pharaoh were
to release the Israelites out of a fear that he will be punished for his past
misdeeds, and that fear were to remain with him and affect later actions,
he would have achieved the level of "repentance out of fear." But that is
not the situation in the Bible's narrative. In the Bible, Pharaoh is already,
right now, being subjected to adversities. If he were to release the Israelites
due to the pressure of the plagues, he would be like "a slave who pleads
before his master while the master is beating him; when the master withdraws the rod of his anger, he will disobey as before." When Pharaoh
would see a break in the plagues, he would harden his heart on his own
and exit his fear-state. The person in a state of ones is responding to a punishment but not to the one who punishes. 32 Albo regards the two types of
putative "fear-repentance" as crucially different: relenting is not the same
as repenting.
The distinction between these two kinds of fear-states and between their
respective statuses as repentance clearly is indispensable to Albo's solution.
But is the distinction convincing? It will not do to draw the distinction entirely in terms of whether the adversity is occurring at the moment of the act or
is simply an anticipated adversity. It seems strange to deny that repentance
that occurs while a person is suffering - a kind of foxhole repentance- can
constitute repentance of some level. Talmudic discussions, furthermore,
which Albo, as a tradition-bound Jewish philosopher, must respect, suggest
that there are such cases.33 What, then, is the basis for Albo's distinction?
From Albo's discussion we may tease out three criteria for an act's attaining
the level of repentance out of fear: (1) S satisfies a certain counterfactual condition; (2) S's act manifests some degree of freedom; (3) S acknowledges the
power of God. Each of his suggestions meets with a difficulty.
Let's look first at the counterfactual condition, Albo's main criterion.
Speaking of the slave who is being beaten by his master, Albo writes:
"when the master removes the rod of his anger, he [the slave] will disobey
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as before." But what this says is that when the duress- or coercion-inducing
factor that is causing him to behave rightly is removed, he will not behave
rightly. Isn't that true, though, even of Alba's other category, the person
who truly repents "out of fear"? It is true that the latter seems to be in an
enduring state, unlike the slave who is being beaten. Still, the duressinducing, or partly coercive, factor that is causing him to behave well, is
the belief that God would punish him if he sins. Remove that factor, and
the person ex hypothesi (and tautologically) will behave badly again. Yet
this stance qualifies as repentance out of fear.
Alba would counter that the slave lacks fear when he is not being beaten, and so this is not a case of repentance out of abiding fear. It is repentance out of an episodic fear. For the critic this is enough to constitute repentance; a rep enter can backslide when the incentive is removed. For Alba,
repentance out of fear must be repentance out of true fear. The repenter out
of fear must be in a certain abiding cognitive and affective state. I think
Alba and his critic are destined to part company on this one. But Alba
needs to address some potential troubles. The Talmud refers to a type of
repentance that occurs in response to afflictions (yissurin)- albeit it treats
this as a separate category from fear-repentance. The Talmud also refers to
people repenting right before death.}.! As well, the critic can adduce cases in
which people repent because of pangs of conscience or feelings of revulsion, but not fear of God. Alba would have to discredit these as falling
short of repentance out of fear; but it's counterintuitive not to think of these
as a level of repentance. Some sources in Jewish tradition suggest that a
person is regarded as a penitent if, when placed in circumstances similar to
those in which he previously sinned, he this time does the right thing- for
any reason, even powerlessness. This may sound much too lenient, but
there is precedent for this perspective in Jewish law. 35
Alba's counterfactual criterion for separating Pharaoh's case from
repentance out of fear thus generates large issues about what kinds of
repentance qualify as fear-repentance. Since the resolution of these issues is
too big to undertake here, we should in the interests of fairness look at his
other two ways of differentiating Pharaoh's case from repentance out of
fear. Neither of the other criteria is successful, I think. Consider criterion
(2): that the case he labels "repentance out of fear" involves an element of
freedom that would not be exemplified by Pharaoh were Pharaoh to
release the Israelites due to pressure from the plagues. How shall we draw
the desired distinction? The most natural avenue is to view the repenterout-of-fear as simply being "unable to take it any more," cracking under
strain and fatigue.'" But one could just as well say that a person who is
threatened with evils gives in to fear, that he caves in to a threat and "can't
take" the threat any more. That is what happens in cases of coercion, which
we said Alba treats as cases of unfree action. Also, as has often been noted
in the literature on coercion, there is a clear sense in which a coerced
agent- even one undergoing an adversity- is making a free, rational
decision by giving in, the decision not to endure certain evils.37 From the
point of view of freedom, it isn't clear that we have a distinction between
responding to anticipated evils and responding to occurrent ones.
Alba's third suggestion does not fare well either. Surely Pharaoh knows
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that God is the source of the ills that are befalling him and his people.
We have, then, two criteria that do not permit Albo to exclude Pharaoh's
would-be repentance from the category of acceptable repentance, and one
that does exclude Pharoah's repentance yet is best described as respectable
but highly debatable (the counterfactual condition). Even with a decent criterion in hand, however, Albo's strategy of linking hardening to the notion
that, were Pharaoh to release the Israelites, his repentance would not be
even at the level of fear-repentance, turns out to be problematic. Note that
after the tenth plague, God does not harden Pharaoh's heart, and Pharaoh
releases the Israelites. Since God does not harden his heart at this point,
Albo must think that Pharaoh has repented. He must regard Pharaoh's
pious-sounding declaration in Exodus 9:27 and 10:16-17, which Albo cites,
that "God is the righteous one, but I and my people are the wicked ones" as
a sincere proclamation, reflecting some type of repentance- either repentance out of love or repentance out of fear. Otherwise why would God, on
Albo's principles, allow the Israelites' release?38 But no sooner has he
released the Israelites than Pharaoh goes back to pursue them. And the pursuit is said by the Bible to be a result of hardening. So Albo has a problem.
Pharaoh repented during plague ten, we said. Further, were Pharaoh to
refrain from pursuit, as he would have done but for the hardening, it would
be because of fear of future reprisal, and should qualify as repentance out of
fear. Why, then, the later hardening?'9
It would be foolish of me to strive for knockdown arguments on each
point I have made. But overall, it is difficult to defend the thesis that were
Pharaoh to release the Israelites during the sixth plague this would not
constitute any level of repentance. As long as fear-repentance has some status, it is not clear why God's hardening does not constitute a prevention of
repentance. The modest claim is not convincing.

5. Alba's bold claim
We come now to the bold claim, which seeks to show that by strengthening Pharaoh's ability to resist giving in to the adversities around him,
God gives Pharaoh a genuine choice whether to keep the Israelites
enslaved or instead release them because of the plagues, a "more real"
choice than he would have without the hardening. With the creation of real
options comes the chance for real repentance. This doesn't necessarily mean
that the hardening creates the opportunity for him to repent out of love;
maybe the most he is capable of is repentance out of fear. But, even granting this quite unmotivated assertion, Albo can regard fear-repentance as
repentance enough. 40
When God gives Pharaoh "choice," what does that mean? On the reading of Albo's intent that I favor, God restores to Pharaoh "eligible alternative possibilities." He strengthens Pharaoh's resolve to keep the Israelites
enslaved; He does not make that resolve so strong that Pharaoh is totally
unmoved by the plagues. When God removes fear from Pharaoh's heart,
he has levelled the playing field: the chances of releasing the Israelites and
keeping them enslaved (because he discounts the plagues as chance occurrences) are equal. 4l
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But there is a deep concern about Albo's bold claim. When he claims
that God restores Pharaoh's free choice, Albo disregards the history of how
Pharaoh came to make that choice. Pharaoh acts as a result of God's externally manipulating his desire to keep the Israelites enslaved (by strengthening that desire and/ or weakening competing ones). The king thus
resembles a person who does act A because a hypnotist implants in him a
desire to do A. An act performed as a result of hypnotic suggestion is widely regarded as an unfree act. Now the analogy to the hypnotized act is not
exact- God is not making the desire irresistible for Pharaoh according to
Albo. Also, God does not implant the desire in Pharaoh's case but only
strengthens it and/or weakens opposing desires. But suppose that someone implants a less-than-irresistible suggestion in 5 to do A, and S does A.
We might call S's act unfree even though he could have done otherwise.
And in a case where a hypnotist only strengthens or weakens certain
desires, but does not implant any, some philosophers would regard the
resultant act as unfree and as reflecting diminished responsibility (assuming the subject is not aware that she is hypnotized).42 Intuitions are not clear
here, but someone brought up on charges for crimes committed under an
influence that is analogous to God's interference with Pharaoh would certainly have a reasonable grounds for acquitta1: 3 The hypnotist analogy is
therefore at least prima facie troubling, and Maimonides and Saadya would
probably both accept it as a counterexample to Albo. 44 Though free choice
may require alternative possibilities, merely having alternative possibilities, on this view, is not sufficient for free choice.
For the sake of both charity and completeness, we might consider a
modification of Albo's account (not put forth by him) that presents a different analysis of why God can be said to have "restored" Pharoah's choice.
By increasing the king's willpower (by weakening certain desires and/ or
strengthening others), God, de facto, is- given Pharaoh's already formed
character- ensuring that he keeps the Israelites enslaved. That is, once he
is hardened to the plagues, Pharaoh reverts to his previously formed personality. He has the opportunity to act in accordance with his true self. If it
is countered that a decision to release the Israelites due to the plagues
would be a decision in character too, since Pharaoh has a character that
makes him cave in to extreme incentives at this precise level of pressure,
the reply would be that releasing the Israelites would be an akratic act on
Pharaoh's part, an act contrary to better judgment, and therefore inconsistent with his character. His character is expressed by actions in accord with
best judgment. Only the decision to keep the Israelites enslaved is in character; the decision to release them is pure weakness. Furthermore, since the
decision is in character, the objection based on the fact it is externally
induced, as in hypnosis, loses its force.
But explaining God's "restoration" of Pharaoh's choice in this way is not
helpful. The account does not explain how the hardening gives Pharaoh an
opportunity to repent; at best it explains how the hardening gives him an
opportunity to act freely. (Albo, recall, was exercised over the repentance
problem.) And even if our interest is in restoring free will rather than
restoring repentance, I have trouble with the premise that akratic acts are
acts out of character. Suppose a politician gives in to temptation at consid-
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erable cost to what he most values. This is akratic behavior. No one, not
even the offender, thinks that giving in to appetite is worth the trouble it
will cause. But isn't it precisely here that we raise the "character" issue?
Isn't the politician free and responsible? One might retort that if the politician resists temptation on almost all occasions but gives in once, his act is
out of character and not free. But why should anyone think that? And isn't
the politician responsible for his act? Furthermore, is the example of the
politician who succumbs once really parallel to Pharaoh's case? For one
thing, in Pharaoh's case the plagues may have had a cumulative impact.
The king's character may be such that given this particular accumulated
temptation to release the Israelites, he would. Moreover, God has to harden Pharaoh's heart repeatedly. This suggests that Pharaoh would be of such
a character as to succumb to the plagues, but for the hardening.
To sum up, Alba's modest claim depends on contestable assumptions
about freedom and about the miminum level needed for repentance. His
bold claim requires some controversial intuitions about the hypnotist
example- intuitions that Maimonides and Saadya would think are wrong.
The suggestion that these reflections encourage is that, pace Albo, Pharaoh
should not be responsible, or should not be fully responsible, for his hardened acts.
Although I am focusing on hardening, we should pause to ask what the
bearing of our discussion is on betterment. (The question will become
important later.) If we define the problem with hardening as the withholding of repentance, then betterment poses no problem at all; or, if anything,
the problem is why God doesn't better more often. But if we define the
problem of hardening in terms of free will deprivation, then insofar as God
intervenes in both hardening and betterment, the free will deprivation
problem applies to both types of intervention. The free will deprivation
problem can be answered, as I indicated, by denying that free will is so
valuable, but even short of that, I would suggest that Albo's bold claim
works reasonably well for betterment. In typical cases of betterment, the
agent will ask to be bettered and to have motivational obstacles to doing
the good removed. I suggest that a person who asks to be hypnotized into
doing certain types of actions, and is then in fact hypnotized into doing
them, is responsible for those actions. An agent bettered by God strengthening or weakening certain desires upon the agent's request is free and
responsible. 4s So the hypnosis objection will not apply to betterment.

6. Maimonides (0: eliminating free will
Returning now to hardening, what if we just accept the hypnotist analogy, see the hardening for the manipulation that it is, deny that the hardened act is free, and give up the idea that Pharaoh was held responsible for
his hardened acts and that he acted freely?16 That is precisely Maimonides'
move. I would justify the move as follows. True, God punishes Pharaoh
and his people. But their eventual fate - their firstborn sons die and, later,
their warriors drown at sea- suggests that it is the original crime of
drowning or trying to drown male Hebrew children that meets with retribution,17 and not necessarily any obstinacy shown by them or their king in
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the face of the plagues. Even if we assume, plausibly, that God held
Pharaoh culpable for his resistance to the earlier plagues, there is no evidence that He held Pharaoh responsible for his later, hardened acts in particular. As a result, it is defensible to hold that - in the Bible's viewPharaoh, as a hardened agent, did not will freely and was not held responsible. If that is right- and some biblical scholars have thought S048_ then
the responsibility problem is a non-starter.
Maimonides in some places states the proposition I have just sought to
motivate, that Pharaoh was not held responsible for his hardened acts. We
still need, however, to grasp God's motive for the hardening and the deprivation of free will. In his monumental legal code, the Mislmeh Torah, in the
section titled, Laws of Repentance (Hilkhat Teshuvah),49 Maimonides fills in
this motive. He asserts that God hardens the agent's heart as a means of
punishing him. The agent is deprived of two great goods- (a) free will,
along with (b) the potential to act rightly- and this is an evil for the hardened agent, quite apart from the augmentation of plagues. Removing free
will is a perfectly just punishment for a person so depraved, an appropriate tit-for-tat. The agent hardened his own heart in the earlier plagues, contrary to God's will, so now his heart becomes hardened by God, contrary
to his own will. Further, he chose to do evil, so now his punishment (or
part of it) is that he does evil. As Norman Kretzmann acutely puts it in
describing a related claim made by Aquinas, hardening is not only a case
of the punishment fitting the crime- rather, hardening is a punishment
that is the very sin that it punishes." so
This account gives rise to an interesting thought: that, paradoxically,
theists who wish to preserve the value of free will do just fine if they
deny that hardened agents will freely. The punishment interpretation
presupposes a high assessment of free will; precisely because free will is a
good, as is the capacity to do the right thing, being deprived of these
counts as a punishment. Insofar as it recognizes the value of free will, the
"punishment" solution is compatible with, indeed dovetails with, freewill theodicies. s1
Unfortunately, Maimonides' solution, as stated thus far, is incomplete.
First of all, it goes no distance toward explaining God's making an agent
better, and in fact can be challenged by the implications that it carries for
betterment. Maimonides obviously cannot say that an agent who is bettered is being punished for previous wrong choices! Even if the present
choice of a right act is a welcome reward for earlier good choices, being
deprived of free will is an evil. So for betterment to be explained the notion
that deprivation of free 'will is a punishment has to give way to the notion
that being deprived of correct choices is a punishment. Second, it is obvious
that Maimonides' account has not yet touched the repentance problem. To
see why God would deprive Pharaoh of repentance, we need to extend
Maimonides' account.
U

7. Maimanides (ii): preventing repentance
Maimonides' approach to the repentance problem is rooted in the Sages'
solution as expressed in the midrash:
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'And the Lord strengthened Pharaoh's heart': Since the Holy One,
Blessed Be He, saw that [Pharaoh] did not change his mind due to the
first five plagues, from then on the Holy One, Blessed Be He, said:
even if he wants to repent, I will strengthen his heart in order to exact
all that is due from him.52
Another midrashic statement articulates the general principle underlying
Pharaoh's case:
Rabbi Phineas the priest, son of Rabbi Hama, said: ... After the Holy
One, Blessed Be He, waits for evildoers to repent and they do not,
then even if they want to repent later, He takes over their heart so
that they not repent. 53
The midrash does not itself specifically deny that Pharaoh was held
responsible and was punished for his hardened acts, but Maimonides
along with other medieval exegetes and philosophers do.54 In a work called
Eight Chapters/5 Maimonides first states that, if Pharaoh and the Egyptians
"had committed no other sin than not letting Israel go free" (due to hardening), then it would have been "an injustice" for God to punish them. (As
noted earlier, Maimonides asserts that any kind of influence by another
agent, other than rational instruction, takes away free wilUh) But in actuality Pharaoh and the Egyptians had earlier oppressed the Israelites- repeatedly. And "this [earlier] action was due to their choice and to the evil character of their thought; there was nothing compelling them to do it." Those
acts therefore merited punishment. But "it was not possible to punish them
if they repented, so they were prevented from repenting and they continued holding [lsrael]."57 Whereas in Laws of Repentance it appeared that the
agent's loss of free will constitutes the punishment, in Eight Chapters it is the
agent's undergoing plagues (or as in Sihon's case military defeat) that constitutes the punishmenU8
So: God did not punish the Egyptians for not repenting, since on
Maimonides' premises (of H-incompatibilism), God cannot punish a person for an act that God brought about. But God can prevent a person from
repenting as a means of exacting punishment for acts previously performed.''!
The differences between Maimonides' account and that of Albo are dramatic. (i) Albo sees God as trying to preserve Pharaoh's chances of free will
and repentance; Maimonides sees God as trying to eliminate Pharaoh's free
will and chances of repenting, on the grounds that Pharaoh does not
deserve a chance to repent. (ll) Albo thinks Pharaoh is responsible for his
later choices. Maimonides denies this. (iii) Albo does not think that the history of Pharaoh's choice to keep the Israelites enslaved- its origin in hardening- undermines Pharaoh's freedom and responsibility. Maimonides
does; though his conception of hardening seems to be far more invasive
than Albo's, he probably would think that even in Albo's scenario there is
too much intervention to allow for free will. 60
There are a few difficulties in the Maimonidean approach enunciated in
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Eight Chapters. First,61 the entire point of repentance would seem to be to
that if a person repents, that person's punishment must be remitted. If the
problem in Pharaoh's case is that God would have to withhold a just punishment, isn't that an objection to the whole notion that repentance averts
punishment, that, in the words of the High Holiday liturgy, "repentance
and prayer and charity avert the evil decree"? It is true that Pharaoh's
crimes are unusually heinous. But other unusually heinous sinners in the
Bible are not punished when they repent. Surely when God forgave the
city of Nineveh, and chastised Jonah for not understanding how He could
do this, God was saying that even perpetrators of heinous sins are entitled
to forgiveness. 62 If we follow Maimonides' reasoning, we would expect
there to be a sliding scale by which the greater the evildoing, the more God
would act to prevent repentance and the less chance there would be of God
allowing repentance. But this would undercut verses that state, "Do I
desire the death of the wicked, says the Lord? Is it not rather his return
from his evil ways, so he will live?" (Ezekiel 18:23), and "I do not desire the
death of he who dies, says the Lord God. Repent and live!" (Ibid. 18:32).
Forgiving penitents is an act of divine mercy, not divine justice. Whatever
philosophical problems plague the notion of remitting punishment,63 a system that accepts repentance is anyway committed to declaring those problems soluble. Once that stance is taken, it is hard to accept that God will
take steps to prevent repentance by certain individuals on the grounds that
they don't deserve it. To quote Voltaire's alleged quip to his priest on his
deathbed, when the priest assured Voltaire that all his sins would be forgiven, "Bien sur qu'il me pardonera, c'est son metier" (of course He'll forgive me- that's his job).64
But even if it is granted that, due to the gravity of Pharaoh's sins, God
should punish Pharoah for those sins fully and should not remit the punishment on account of Pharaoh's repentance, we can formulate a second
objection to Maimonides. If it's really so unjust for Pharaoh's punishment
to be remitted,let it not be remitted. But does it follow from the need to
punish Pharaoh that God should not allow Pharaoh the opportunity to
repent? Isn't there value in repentance even if the penitent does not have
his punishment remitted? Isn't there value in allowing his self-transformation? If it's unjust for Pharoah to be forgiven, let God punish him for his
earlier wrongs, but let Pharaoh at least improve himself while the axe falls.
Let there be repentance without mitigation.
How cogent are these objections? As regards the first question, which
boils down to "how is Pharaoh different from other sinners?," to some
extent the critic's modus tollens is Maimonides' modus pOllens: great evildoers, in his view, do stand less chance of repenting than others, because
they stand less chance of God allowing them to repent. But there is
another reply. We should remember that, according to the biblical text,
God hardened Pharaoh's heart in order to display the divine power and
"multiply my wonders in the Land of Egypt" (Exodus 12:9). The Bible
implies several times that God hardened Pharaoh's heart because by
continuing the plagues God enhanced His glory. It was necessary for
him to manifest His power fully. This point encourages a modified punishment strategy. It may be that God does not harden the hearts of all
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evildoers, because sometimes the harmful consequences for others will
outweigh the "good" of punishment. But when God has another motive
to harden- say, to multiply His wonders, or to deliver an enemy to
Israel (as in Sihon's case)- then He will do so, but only provided that
the hardened agent deserves the hardening. To put it another way, the
agent's past wickedness is a reason for God's allowing Himself to harden
once the hardening is necessary for other reasons; it is not itself a reason to
harden. This isn't the plain sense of Maimonides' words, but it accounts
for what otherwise seems to be an arbitrary exception being made of
Pharaoh. The explanation requires withdrawing Maimonides' account of
the later plagues as punishment for Pharaoh, and replacing it with an
account of the plagues as needed to enhance God's greatness. That
Pharaoh deserves punishment should be utilized as a reply to an objection to hardening for the sake of God's glory, not as a reason for the
hardening.
Turning to the second question, of why God doesn't punish even
while accepting repentance, I suspect that the answer has to do with the
fact that Pharaoh's "repentance," which is being prevented, would be of
a low level: it is due to immediate pressure. Maimonides (contrary to
Albo) may hold that this is a level of repentance, and furthermore that it
is a level of repentance such that a person who attains that level must
have his punishment withdrawn. Now you will ask, why should the fact
the repentance is on a low level mean that the punishment must be withdrawn? Shouldn't it be the other way around, that a low level repentance has less chance of making punishment be withdrawn?
This question can be answered by noting that Maimonides thinks, in
general, that being motivated by anticipations of reward and punishment reflects a low level of religious understanding. In the last chapter
of the section of his Mishneh Torah legal code called Laws of Repentance
(and elsewhere), he posits an ideal of "worship of God out of love," in
which one's worship is not motivated by any concern other than the
intrinsic rightness or wrongness of what one is doing. The entire content
of repentance out of fear is exhausted by expiation, by the withdrawing
of punishment. A person on a higher level will not be concerned with
punishment. So, paradoxically, a person on lower level of repentance
must have his sins forgiven and punishment withheld, because expiation is the only purpose that lower level repentance could serve for him
when there is no deep change in the person's orientation toward God. hs
Even accepting this somewhat forced answer to the second objection,
a third objection arises. Maimonides makes it seem as if God cannot
inflict a just punishment on Pharaoh if he repents. But could He not just
reduce the punishment in the light of repentance? If so, it could turn out
that the result even of mitigating the sentence is a punishment as harsh
in its effect as a nonmitigated sentence. Imagine someone sentenced to
three hundred years in prison for multiple crimes whose sentence is
reduced to 200 years for good behavior! Mitigating Pharaoh's punishment might still result in him being drowned at sea. And such mitigation is consistent with the demands of lower level repentance. 66
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8. God and responsibility for one's character
The "Maimonidean" solutions we have explored to this point surface

explicitly in Maimonides' treatment of hardening; that is, he openly relates
hardening to the inappropriateness of God remitting Pharaoh's punishment. The next two solutions that I will assess- the final two we will consider- are not explicitly formulated by him, but instead are variations on
themes that are found in Maimonides' writings. These solutions, I concede,
do not sit easily with the explicit Maimonidean treatments of hardening in
terms of remitting punishment, but it is a commonplace among interpreters of Maimonides that his explicit, "exoteric" statements are not
always a reliable guide to his "esoteric" meaning and deepest intent,67 Also,
the solutions to follow are at least loosely connected to Maimonidean
teachings, and can be ascribed to him by what philosophers call the
Principle of (Interpretive) Charity. It is beside my main point to argue that
Maimonides actually intends these solutions, but I do believe he may, and
they must be considered regardless.
The basic perspective of these final two solutions derives from the Bible
and Talmud. In Psalms 81:11-12, we read: "But my people would not listen
to me; Israel would not submit to me. So I gave them over to their stubborn
hearts to follow their own devices." What is being asserted here is that God
allows people to follow their own choices, without divine interference,
even when their choices are wrong. The Talmud goes further when it
teaches: "In the way a person wants to go, we take him" (Makkot lOb). And
on Sabbath 104a, Rabbi Simon ben Lakish (known as Resh Lakish) states
that "when one comes to be declared impure, we give him an opening [to
impurity]; when one comes to be purified, we assist him./68 Extended to
God's hardening of Pharaoh's heart, these ideas suggest that hardening is
God's way of respecting Pharaoh's own choices, of allowing him to follow
in his chosen path while imposing upon him (contrary to the earlier suggestions) full responsibility for those hardened acts. The purpose is not to
give people their previously incurred just deserts- as in Eight Chaptersbut to preserve the human being's control over his or her own destiny.
We considered a similar bold response in connection with Albo, and the
problem I would pose for the present version of the "responsibility for
choice" reply is similar to the difficulty we raised in that earlier context.
Without God's hardening, Pharaoh would not have chosen to keep the
Israelites enslaved. God can't say to Pharaoh, "you have to live with the
results of your choices," because Pharaoh can turn around and say, "granted my previous choices were bad, my choice now wouldn't have been to
keep them as slaves- that's your doing." The strategy of ascribing responsibility to Pharaoh for his "hardened" choices, if it is adopted at all, has to
be implemented along very different lines. 69

9. A naturalist account of hardening
The distinguished biblical scholar Umber to Cassuto (1883-1951)
explains the expression "God hardened Pharaoh's heart" as follows:
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In early Hebrew diction, it is customary to attribute every phenomenon to the direct action of God .... Every happening has a number of
causes, and these causes, in turn, have other causes, and so on ad
infinitum; according to the Israelite conception, the cause of all causes
was the will of God, the Creator and Ruler of the world. Now the
philosopher examines the long and complex chain of causation,
whereas the ordinary person jumps instantly from the last effect to
the first cause, and attributes the former directly to God. This, now, is
how the Torah, which employs human idioms, expresses itself.
Consequently the expression 'but I will harden his heart' is, in the
final analysis, the same as if it were worded: but his heart will be
hard?O
For Cassuto, "God hardens people's hearts" is shorthand for "people's
hearts sometimes become hard." Once hardening is read naturalistically,
with no implication of divine intervention, the standard problems about
deprivation of free will, prevention of repentance, and assignment of
responsibility become non-starters. Hardening, on this view, is not a foml
of direct divine action.
Cassuto's position is not as clear as we might like it to be. If God is the
first cause, does that mean that He initiates a causal sequence that leads to
Pharaoh's heart becoming hard? If so, a hardened heart is still a manipulated heart. Cassuto may mean that God is the author of nature. If so,
Cassuto's naturalist reading of the Bible's language is strikingly like an
assertion made explicitly by Maimonides in his philosophic magnum opus,
Guide of the Perplexed. There Maimonides endorses a general thesis that
when Scripture attributes actions to God it is speaking of natural processes
and not direct interventions.71 He could thus consider divine hardening to
be a natural process- indeed would have to, at least at the esoteric level of
the Guide.
But the naturalist account, as we have stated it, suffers from an obvious
weakness. According to the account, Pharaoh's earlier "self-hardenings"
and God's later"other" -hardenings seem to refer to the same type of event,
a self-hardening. Why then does the Bible use differing expressions for
what is allegedly the same type of event? Cassuto replies that "they can be
interchanged because their essential meaning is identical."72 But why
would the Bible vary its language at all? Why wouldn't "the ordinary person" of whom Cassuto speaks ascribe all the hardenings to GodT3
There is a version of the naturalist account that can meet this objection.
It is offered by an eminent present-day biblical scholar, Nachum Sarna:
This ['God hardened Pharaoh's heart'] is the biblical way of asserting
that the king's intransigence has by then become habitual and irreversible; his character has become his destiny. He is deprived of the
possibility of relenting and is irresistibly impelled to his self-wrought
doom?4
Sarna's view, as I want to reconstruct it here, interprets "God hardened
Pharaoh's heart" as follows (the wording is mine):
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In the natural order of things a person sometimes will make choices
that later on cause him to disregard incentives against making that
sort of choice and that deprive him of the possibility of deciding otherwise. Pharaoh's choice not to release the Israelites in the face of
plague six was due to earlier choices Pharaoh had made, choices that
caused him to disregard incentives for releasing them and that rendered unavoidable the choice he in fact made, viz., to keep them
enslaved.
As in Cassuto's solution, the question of how God could hold Pharaoh
responsible is now a non-starter. Aristotle held that a person is responsible
for his or her character if the person's earlier choices led up to that character. If we apply an Aristotelian conception of responsibility for character to
Pharaoh's case, then Pharaoh bears responsibility for hardened acts. 75 Bad
people are held responsible for unavoidable bad acts when their previous
choices produced those later unavoidable acts. The approach just sketched
is in flat opposition to Maimonides' idea in Eight Chapters that Pharaoh was
not punished for his hardened acts. On the contrary: the "hardened" agent
bears responsibility. But, again, naturalism may be his esoteric teaching. 76
With Sarna's approach in hand, let us return to the problem that confronted Cassuto's: why does the Bible vary its language? The answer to
this question is that Pharaoh's "self-hardenings" in plagues 1-5 were not
wholly determined by previous choices he had made. Those choices were
reversible in the sense that he could choose differently. But from plagues
six and onward Pharaoh had no choice anymore-hence the shift in the
Bible's language. Adapting a remark made by Harry Wolfson, we may say:
God gives every human being the power to sin or not sin (i. e., free will),
but He does not give every human being the power to repent or not
repent,77
A challenge to the new version of naturalism may be marshalled from
the Bible's description of plague seven-where Pharaoh hardens his own
heart. If "God's hardened Pharaoh's heart" (plague six) is really another
way of saying that Pharaoh's previous choices have caused him to keep the
Israelites enslaved, that his path has become irreversible, and that his character has become his destiny, why would Pharaoh in plague seven be said
to harden his own heart, implying (on the present theory) that his path of
plague six was not irreversible after all?
The naturalist's answer to this, I suggest, is that although Pharaoh's
choices in plagues 1-5 made it inevitable that he chose to keep the Israelites
in plague six, it does not follow that his choice in plague seven is also due
to his choices in plagues 1-5. Perhaps the incentives in plague seven to
release the Israelites were greater than those in plague six, and even a person for whom the choice in plague six was inevitable could have acted otherwise in plague seven. No matter how bad a person's character has
become, there are circumstances in which that character does not by itself
dictate a bad choice. If we assume further that, in other plagues in which
God hardened Pharaoh's heart, Pharaoh's obstinacy was a result only of his
previous choices and that there was no significant change in the power of
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the incentives produced by the new plague, we can explain the variations
in the Bible's language.
Another objection to the naturalistic account is that it renders
Maimonides' question- how God could harden Pharaoh's heart-a nonstarter. But in the first place, this is not an objection to the account itself, but
only to an attribution of the account to Maimonides. Furthermore, the
question is not a non-starter from a naturalist standpoint. Maimonides' earlier claim in chapter five of Laws of Repentance was that a human being
always has free choice; it is therefore entirely appropriate for him to ask
why human beings, in the course of nature, occasionally lose free choice
and the power to repent- why did God set up nature this way?
The naturalist account, in Sarna's version, has withstood our objections
thus far. But another problem has to be faced. As we have seen, the Bible
attributes a motive to God for the hardening, namely, God must manifest
his full power. But according to the naturalist account, what does it mean
to ascribe a motive to God? Aren't Pharaoh's "divinely hardened" acts
explicable without reference to a motive God has for the hardening? And
how does a divine motive fit in with the account?78
I suggest that God's "motive" may be fit into the account if we return to
the full statement in the Talmud we quoted earlier: "when one comes to be
declared impure, we give him an opening [to impurity]; when one comes to
be purified, we assist him." Suppose that, although God does not directly
intervene in any person's motivational system to produce sinful decisions,
(a) He does directly intervene to produce good decisions when He sees that
a person is trying to repent and (b) He does this even if the person is trying
to repent only because he harbors fear. It follows that if Pharaoh wanted to
release the Israelites- for whatever reason, even fear- then God ordinarily
would assist him in repenting (by, say, intervening to stifle any inclination
to slip back into doing the wrong thing). But suppose further that God on
occasion chooses to withhold assistance because He wants to realize certain goals, the attainment of which are more valuable to him than the sinner's repenting. In other words, suppose we say that God sometimes withholds a kind of assistance He would normally provide. Then we can say of
Pharaoh something similar to what is said by Wolfson, paraphrasing
Abraham ibn Daud (ca. 1110-1180): "God did not think of him [Pharaoh] as
meriting His auxiliary grace in assisting him to turn away from his free
choice of his evil conduct."79 Departing from Wolfson, I am suggesting that
God's withholding motivational assistance is a function not only of
Pharaoh's merit but also a function of God's having the motive of manifesting His power so as to make himself known to the Egyptians and Israelites.
The withheld-assistance view treats hardening as a nonmiraculous natural
process, the way things go when there's no divine intervention; only betterment is explained supernaturally. And hardening is basically the withholding of assistance. The theory of hardening needs to be accompanied by
a particular account of betterment.so
I have suggested that Sarna's version of the naturalist account of hardening can meet the textual objections we have raised, but that, for the
account to explain the Bible's reference to God's motive, it needs to combine a naturalistic view of the process of hardening with a supernatural
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account of the process of betterment. Notice, however, that our explanation
suggests that Pharaoh would have qualified for divine assistance were it
not for God's desire to manifest His power. Can this be? Typically, betterment involves a person soliciting God's help. Pharaoh did not solicit God's
help in repenting. So why would God have helped him were it not for
God's desire to manifest His power?
The smoothest reply to this question would be that an agent's asking
God for assistance is not a necessary condition of God's assisting that person. Although God would not have helped Pharaoh for the reason that
Pharaoh would have solicited His help, God would have had another reason to help the king. What is that reason? Simply that the Israelites were
suffering. In other words, were it not for the motive of manifesting His
greatness so as to impart knowledge of Himself, God would have bettered
Pharaoh, for the sake of the Israelites, even if Pharaoh were not to solicit
His assistance in repenting.
Inevitably the question arises whether the supernaturalist account of
betterment can explain why bettered agents are "responsible" for, i. e.
given credit for, their bettered acts, or whether such an account must,
instead, deny that hardened agents bear such responsibility. Earlier we
said that whereas Albo's "bold" attempt to explain hardening failed, an
analogous approach to betterment, in which betterment is God's removing
motivational impediments to doing good upon solicitation by the agent, followed by the agent's choosing the good, would not fall foul of the hypnotist objection that troubled the bold account of hardening. Hence, supernaturally bettered agents bear responsibility for their "bettered" acts in those
cases when the agent asks to be bettered. In cases in which no request is
made by the agent, the agent may not bear responsibility. So, for example,
if God were to help Pharaoh repent when Pharaoh does not ask for His
help (for example, if He were to help him repent only because the Israelites
were suffering), Pharaoh may not receive credit for this "repentance." So,
some bettered agents (those who ask for betterment) are responsible for,
i.e. get moral credit for, "bettered" acts; other bettered agents (those who
are bettered for other reasons) are not thus responsible. The text does not
state any of this, but it stands to reason.
At this point, a final issue must be broached. Can Maimonides accept
the supernatural account of betterment that we presented as a companion
to the naturalist view of hardening? Jerome Gellman has cited textual evidence that Maimonides understood betterment in a naturalist fashion. 81
Gellman does not suggest that something like the hypnotist analogy troubled Maimonides in the case of betterment. Nor does he argue merely from
the linguistic assertion by Maimonides that "God does X" is to be read naturalistically. Instead Gellman argues that naturalism about betterment
coheres with Maimonides' religious sensibilities, in particular his notion
that human beings are "radically responsible" for their destinies. On
Gellman's reading, Maimonides, for various theological reasons, wanted to
affirm human independence and strength, the capacity of human beings to
transform themselves on their own; and he wanted to place responsibility
for destiny squarely in human hands. 82 As a great twentieth-century explicator of Maimonides put it, "in this task [repentance], man must rely upon
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himself; no one can help him. He is his own creator and innovator. He is
his own redeemer... "83 (Pelagianism is no heresy in Judaism.)
But if the argument I gave earlier is correct, then the naturalist view of
hardening that best explains the biblical references to God's having a
motive is one that is accompanied by a supernatural approach to betterment- a theory on which, while transformation of personality for the better originates in self, it is completed by God. It is questionable whether
Maimonides can embrace this resolution given his religious sensibilities as
explained by Gellman. Hence, at the bottom line, the acceptability of the
"withheld assistance" account of hardening depends on one's religious
sensibilities concerning the extent to which human beings control their
character. Some will read Maimonides in a less naturalistic way than
Gellman, while others, endorsing Gellman's interpretation, will view our
proposed solution as decidely non-Maimonidean. At the same time, it is
hard to see what alternative account would meet both philosophical and
exegetical desiderata. What emerges in any event from any sort of naturalist understanding of hardening or betterment is that keeping God to at
least some extent out of human choice has certain theological advantages. 84

Yeshiva University
NOTES
1. William Alston, among others, suggests that Christianity requires the
idea that God is active at least in positive personal transformation - a comment which suggests that Christian thinkers who believe in free will are obliged to develop some version of a compatibility thesis. See Alston, "The
Indwelling of the Holy Spirit," in Philosophy and the Christian Faith, edited by
Thomas V. Morris (Notre Dame, Ind., 1988), 121-50, esp. pp. 124-25. An
extreme version of the compatibility of human freedom with God's activities is
found in Jonathan Edwards' writings. See Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey
(Yale U. Press, 1957).
2. That God intervenes in motivational systems is also suggested by the
doctrine that God has a plan for history. For a fuller statement of this difficulty
and a discussion of the narrative of Joseph and his brothers in its light, see
Shalom Carmy and David Shatz, 'The Bible As a Source for Philosophical
Reflection," in The Routledge History of Jewish Philosophy, ed. Daniel Frank and
Oliver Leaman (London, 1996), 13-37, at pp. 25-29.
3. Relevant references include Exodus 4:21, 7:3, 9:12, 10:1, 20, 27; 11:10;
14:4,8,17, and arguably 14:5, 18.
4. Deut. 2:30; Joshua 11:20.
5. Cf. Paul's statement: "God hardens whom He will" (Romans 9:18).
6. 1 Kings 18:37.
7. Saadya Gaon, in his Book of Beliefs and Opinions, trans. Samuel
Rosenblatt (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1948), IV, ch. 6, p. 199,
interprets "strengthened (or hardened) his heart" to mean that he kept
Pharaoh alive; Isaac Arama (see note 61), that he gave Pharaoh respite between
plagues.
8. Saadya Gaon, p. 188. Hardening is among eight scriptural challenges
that Saadya considers to his views on free will; see pp. 196-294.
9. Maimonides declares that "no one forces a person or decrees upon him
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or draws him to one of the two paths; rather he inclines on his own and from
his own knowledge to one of the two paths." See Mishneh Torah, Book of
Knowledge, Laws of Repentance, 5:2. For a translation, see Moses Hyamson's edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). Maimonides' statement, like
Saadya's, suggests an incompatibility between divine intervention and free
willi responsibility; we shall see later whether he truly holds this view. But
Maimonides, unlike Saaadya, does not hold that God never intervenes in motivational systems.
10. For surveys of other approaches to hardening in Jewish sources, see
Harry Austryn Wolfson, Repercussions of the Kalam in Jewish Philosophy
(Harvard University Press, 1979),200-214; Nechama Leibowitz, Studies in
Shemot [Exodus], translated and adapted by Aryeh Newman (Jerusalem: World
Zionist Organization, 1976), 149-60; Yehuda Nachshoni, Studies in the Weekly
Parasha (Brooklyn: Mesorah Publications, 1988), 361-67.
11. Elsewhere I have considered and argued against a contemporary solution to these puzzles of hardening and sanctification, one that recruits Harry
Frankfurt's "hierarchical" account of freedom to show that hardened agents
have free will. This strategy is a version of the compatibility thesis we may call
"H-compatibilism" - that hardening is compatible with free will and moral
responsibility. See my "Hierarchical Theories of Freedom and the Hardening
of Hearts", Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXI, ed. H. Wettstein, et. al. (u. of
Notre Dame, in press). In that paper I discuss Eleonore Stump's stimulating
article, "Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of
Free Will," The Journal of Philosophy 85, 8 (August 1988):395-420, repr. in
Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, edited John Martin Fischer and Mark
Ravizza (Ithaca, N. Y, 1993). Other contemporary contributions to the topics of
hardening and sanctification include Norman Kretzmann, "God among the
Causes of Moral Evil: Hardening of Hearts and Spiritual Blinding,"
Philosophical Topics 16,2 (Fall 1988): 189-214; Alston, "The Indwelling of the
Holy Spirit."
12. Likewise, the free will deprivation problem becomes acute if one
explains divine hiddenness in a particular way. Suppose that, when asked,
"why does a good God not provide sufficient, incontrovertible evidence for
His existence?," a theist answers that were God to reveal himself fully and evidently, people would no longer believe in him freely but would rather be
coerced into believing. Here again a theist would be assigning a high value to
free will. For a defense of this sort, see Michael Murray, "Coercion and the
Hiddenness of God," American Philosophical Quarterly 30(1993):27-38. For criticisms of theistic responses to the problem of hiddenness, see Robert McKim,
"the Hiddenness of God," Religious Studies 26(1990): 141-61 and J. L.
Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1993).
13. See Moses Nahmanides' commentary to Gen. 2:9 and Deut 30:6.
Nahmanides' position assumes that freedom requires alternative possibilities.
For a treatment of "automatic goodness" that does not assume this and therefore regards right acts as free even in the absence of alternative possibilities, see
Eleonore Stump, "Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," in
Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, ed. Fischer and Ravizza, 237-62. Cf. my
"Irresistible Goodness and Alternative Possibilities," in Freedom and Moral
Responsibility: General and Jewish Perspectives, edited by Charles Manekin and
Menachem Kellner (Baltimore, Md., 1997), 33-73.
14. For some problems in the free will theodicist's evaluations, see Robert
Merrihew Adams, "Theodicy and Divine Intervention," in The God Who Acts,
ed. Thomas F. Tracy (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994),31-40.
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15. Gersonides, in fact, suggests that although God wants to preserve the
free choice of ordinary human beings, God controls kings' hearts because of the
impact a wicked king can have on the social order and the course of history.
See Gersonides' commentary to Proverbs 21:1. In his commentary to Exodus
7:3, he applies this general notion to Pharaoh's case.
16. I set the causation problem aside; the philosophers I discuss have little
to say about it. Aquinas is concerned with causation, however. See Kretzmann,
"God Among the Causes of Evil." Aquinas's discussion appears in Summa
Theologica laIIae, Q. 79.
17. Joseph Albo, The Book of Roots, IV:25, my translation. There is a bilingual edition of this work by Isaac Huzik (Philadelphia, 1929).
18. The "modest" claim I outline is not as explicit in Albo as in Ovadyah
Seforno's and Nahmanides's commentaries to Ex. 7:3. However, I take the liberty of expounding Albo in light of those more elaborate statements asserting
the modest claim. A reader who is troubled by this procedure is welcome to
substitute Seforno for Albo.
19. Of course different theorists will flesh out the bold claim differently,
depending on their favored accounts of free will, but I will stick with Albo's
conception of free will as involving alternative possibilities. See n. 40 below.
20. I leave out further complications caused by God's knowing in advance
that Pharaoh won't repent anyway even if given the opportunity.
21. See Ex. 7:3, 10:1, 11:9. Seforno incorporates these references into his
interpretation. But cf. Rashi (Rabbi Shlomo Yitzhaki, 1040-1105) to 7:3, for a different view of the relationship between hardening and manifestation of power.
On the theme of "knowledge of God," see, e. g., Ex. 5:2, 6:7, 7:5, 7:17, 8:6, 8:18,
9:14,9:29, 10:2, 11:7, 14:4, 14:18. The theme continues throughout the Israelites'
sojourns after the Exodus.
22. See, e. g., Seforno to Ex. 7:3.
23. Williams, How Free Does the Will Need to Be? (Lindley lecture, U. of
Kansas, 1986), p. 2. See also Harry Frankfurt, "Coercion and Moral
Responsibility," in The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays
(Cambridge University Press, 1988), 80-94, at pp. 44-46; Michael J. Murray and
David Dudrick, "Are Coerced Acts Free?," American Philosophical Quarterly
32(1995):109-24.
24. The example is adapted from Frankfurt, "Coercion and Moral
Responsibility," 44-46.
25. I borrow this term from Murray and Dudrick, "Are Coerced Acts
Free?"
26. I examine this problem for libertarians in "Irresistible Goodness and
Alternative Possibilities."
27. In truth, libertarians confront a stronger challenge: they owe us an
account of why agents are said to be free even when natural contingencies have
left them with but one reasonable course. For one libertarian strategy, see my
"Irresistible Goodness and Alternative Possibilities." Cf. Peter van Inwagen,
"When Is the Will Free?" Philosophical Perspectives 3, ed. James E. Tomberlin
(Tascadero, California: Ridgeview, 1989), 399-422.
28. It is unlikely that God's hardening caused the later self-hardening to
take place, since God's hardening has to be repeated later.
29. This is the kind of counterfactual involved in the debate over middle
knowledge, that is, the debate whether God has knowledge of counterfactuals
whose truth depends on human free choice. See Robert M. Adams, "Middle
Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,' in his The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays
(New York, 1987), 77-93.
30. Later I will raise the possibility that Pharaoh's previous acts are what
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hardened him, an interpretation that forces me to regard Pharaoh's case not as
one involving alternative possibilities. But Albo isn't saying that the previous
acts hardened him.
31. See Babylonian Talmud, Yoma 86b.
32. This formulation is suggested by Nachshoni, p. 367.
33. See, e.g. Berakhot Sa.
34. Babylonian Talmud, Yoma 86a.
35. For an exploration of these varied cases, see the discourses of Rabbi
Joseph B. Soloveitchik that are collected in SolOIJeitchik on Repentance, adapted
by Pinchas H. Peli, (Paulist Press, 1984), passim.; a good place to focus on is 14653. Cf. Norvin Richards, "Forgiveness," Ethics 99, 1 (October 1988): 77-97, pp.
87-92. The definition of repentance in terms of not repeating the act when
placed in similar circumstances is found in the Talmud, Yoma 86b; the example
of the powerless individual is found in Maimonides, Mishllch Torah, Laws of
Repentance 2:1. Of some importance are textual variants of the Talmud that
affect whether the criterion of not repeating the act applies to one who does not
repeat it in one subsequent opportunity (Maimonides) or instead only to one
who does not repeat it in three subsequent opportunities (as other variants
suggest). I admit that Albo may not accept these other analyses,and further
realize that Pharaoh may not satisfy such internal conditions as resolving not
to repeat the sin. But it is still clear that Alba's formulation is problematic.
(Eleonore Stump pointed out to me difficulties in the category of repentance
due to powerlessness, but I will set these aside since the other cases provide
sufficient trouble for Albo.)
36. The fatigue factor is central in Stump's analysis of hardening cases in
"Sanctification ... ".
37. Cf. Alan Wertheimer, Coercion (Princeton University Press, 1987), part
two.
38. It may be replied that Pharaoh has not repented, but by this time God
has manifested His power and so the slaves can be released. But what becomes
of Alba's concern with ensuring Pharaoh's repentance? And in any case, the
later hardening at sea (to be discussed in a moment) makes sense only if
Pharaoh fears future reprisal.
39. I admit that the later hardening leading to pursuit seems to be part of a
continuing plan on God's part to get the Egyptians to "know" Him; verses
14:4, 18 suggest this. But Pharaoh still seems to have attained a level of repentance out of fear even in the absence of this full knowledge.
40. Alba's apparent assumption that freedom requires alternative possibilities has come under repeated attacks in recent years. The seminal argument
against alternative possibilities is Harry Frankfurt's" Alternate Possibilities and
Moral Responsibility." That paper, plus a variety of responses to it, may be
found in Moral Responsibility, edited by John Martin Fischer (Ithaca: Cornell U.
Press, 1986), Pt. II. For additional discussion see Perspectives on Moral
Responsibility, edited by Fischer and Ravizza, pt. 3. It is true that these attacks
have usually assailed the claim that alternative possibilities are necessary for
freedom, not the claim that voluntariness plus alternative possibilities is sufficient for freedom. However, once the necessity claim is dropped, it will be
more natural to hold, in developing the bold claim, that Pharaoh's freedom
consists in his satisfying certain conditions that will create free will even when
there are no alternative possibilities. That is the essence of the hierarchical strategy I referred to earlier and have assessed elsewhere. Having said that, I still
would like to cast Albo's bold solution in terms of alternative possibilities. In
addition, I will use the alternative possibilities account in my discussion of the
Maimonidean strategies.
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41. One may object as follows- a poor objection, I think, but instructive.
"Suppose Pharaoh were to deliberate between releasing the Israelites and
keeping them enslaved and then were to decide to release them. The decision
to release would still be, in Albo's phrase, 'like one that is compelled rather
than voluntary.' Pharaoh would have released them only to prevent another
agent (God) from inflicting harm on him and his people. And compliance with
a threat is unfree compliance. For a person to do A freely, the person must be
able not merely to do otherwise, but to do otherwise freely. Since if Pharaoh
were to 'do otherwise' and release the slaves, he would not 'do otherwise'
freely, therefore he does not freely keep them enslaved either."
This objection is doubly flawed. First, as we said earlier, acts performed
under duress may be free rather than unfree. Now it is not in Albo's interest to
pursue this response; to develop his modest claim he needed to declare that
acts under duress are unfree. A better response for Albo, therefore, is to deny
that for S to do A freely, S must be able not merely to do otherwise, but to do
otherwise without duress. There is merit in this denial. (The issue of whether
the alternative possibilities must be free actions is discussed by John Martin
Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control [Blackwell, 1994], 14047.) In fact a case can be made that any time a person has two eligible alternatives and selects one, the person acts freely- even when the selected alternative, taken by itself, is a coerced act. Suppose mugger A approaches Smith and
threatens him, "rob the Chase bank or I'll kill you." Mugger B approaches
Smith and threatens the very opposite: "if you rob the Chase bank like mugger
A said, then I'll kill you." Smith has two alternatives open here-- obey A or
obey B- and when he chooses to comply with mugger A and not mugger B or
mugger B and not mugger A, he is making a free choice. A fortiori, if Pharaoh
opts to release the Israelites due to duress, Pharaoh acts freely, so long as
another option is eligible.
42. The problem posed by hypnotists is not confined to cases in which the
suggestion planted renders a particular outcome at least probable. The excuse
is effective as long as a causal connection can be established.
43. At the end of "Hierarchical Theories of Freedom and the Hardening of
Hearts," however, I suggest that hierarchical theories confront a more troubling form of this objection than Albo does.
44. This discussion cannot be complete without at least a reference to the
fact that Maimonides, in another context, sides with Albo! Jewish law requires
that in order for a writ of divorce (get) to be valid, a husband must voluntarily
consent to divorce his wife. However, in cases where the sages regarded the
divorce as mandatory, the husband may be compelled by a court to grant the
get. "But," Maimonides queries, "why is the divorce not invalidated" if it is
compelled? His answer basically, is that the husband's deeper will is to obey
the law, which requires him to issue the divorce, but "his evil inclination overcame him." The court pressure removes the "alien" desire not to divorce her.
See Mishneh Torah, Laws of Divorce, 2:20. Maimonides' reasoning resembles
closely the reasoning of those who champion "positive liberty," though it isn't
clear whether he is asserting that all Israelites "really" want to obey the law.
One could argue that the fact the agent is here being made to act rightly is relevant to the status of the resulting act as free; but in what follows I argue that
betterment is different from hardening only if the person being bettered solicits
the other agent's intervention, which is not the case in the passage at hand. So
there is a tension between the position I think Maimonides would take vis-avis Albo's bold claim and the position he takes in the divorce passage, and I do
not know how to resolve it.
45. I argue for this more fully in "Hierarchical Theories of Freedom and
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the Hardening of Hearts."
46. Saying S wasn't responsible generally entails saying he didn't act freely.
There are exceptions, e. g., negligence, but none that operate in this context.
47. See Exodus 1. The Bible does not explicitly say that the king's order to
drown males (1 :22) was carried out, but commentators frequently claim it was,
even though the midwives had refused to cooperate with a previous decree to
kill newborn males. That the baby Moses had to be hidden (chapter 2) suggests
what one would infer anyway, to wit, that male Hebrew infants were in danger after Pharaoh issued a decree to drown them.
48. See Umberto Cassuto's remarks in A Commentary on the Book of Exodus
(Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1967),57. Cassuto notes that not only in Pharaoh's
case but in Sihon's as well, God is not said to hold hardened agents responsible
for their hardened acts.
49. Mishneh Torah: Book of Knowledge: Laws of Repentance, chapter 6.
50. Kretzmann, "God Among the Causes of Evil," 205.
51. To be sure, in one respect the punishment approach runs contrary to
free will theodicies: the punishment solution allows that evils may occur even
when free will is not preserved. They occur because (a) God's manifesting His
greatness and inculcating knowledge of Himself is of prime importance; (b)
God holds people responsible for their previous choices. He allows suffering to
result from the punishment that he imposes when he deprives a wicked agent
of the great good known as free will.
52. Midrash Rabbah, Exodus, 11:6. An English edition of Midrash Rabbah was
produced under the editorship of H. Freedman and M. Simon (London:
Soncino, 1977).
53. Ibid., 11:1. See also 5:7.
54. In addition to Maimonides, see Nahmanides' commentary to Ex. 7:3;
also Rabbi David Kimchi's (Radak's) comments to Joshua 11 :20, 1 Samuel 2:25,
1 Kings 18:37, Isaiah 6:9, and Ezekiel 14:9. Also see Metzudot David to Ezekiel
1:9 and 36:26, Proverbs 14:30, and Nehemiah 13:26.
55. Eight Chapters is part of Maimonides' commentary to the Mishnahspecifically, it is his introduction to his commentary on the tractate Avot, or
Ethics of the Fathers. I summarize here chapter eight. Quotations are from the
English translation in Ethical Writings of Maimonides, edited by Raymond L.
Weiss and Charles Butterworth (New York, 1975),89-94.
56. It has been debated whether Maimonides is a compatibilist regarding
scientific determinism. See Alexander Altmann, "Free Will and Predestination
in Saadia, Bahya, and Maimonides," repro in Altmann, Essays in Jewish
Intellectual History (Hanover, New Hampshire: New England University Press,
1981), 35-63; Shlomo Pines, "Notes on Maimonides' Views Concerning Free
Will," Excursus to "Studies in Abul-Barakat al-Baghdadi's Poetrics and
Metaphysics," Scripta Hicrosolymitana 6(1960): 195~98; Jerome Gellman,
"Freedom and Determinism in Maimonides' Philosophy," in Maimonides and
His Time, ed. Eric Ormsby (Washington, D. c.: Catholic University Press, 1989);
and, most recently, Josef Stern, "Maimonides' Compatibilist Conceptions of
Freedom and the Sense of Shame," in Manekin and Kellner, pp. 217-66.
57. This translation is from Weiss and Butterworth, 90.
58. I may be overstating the differences between Eight Chapters and Laws of
Repentance: Maimonides may not really have something different in mind. But
for analytical purposes it is worth treating the ideas of free will as punishment
and repentance as punishment separately.
59. For discussion of the related but distinct view held by Aquinas, see
Kretzmann, "God Among the Causes of Evil," 198ff. See also Murray,
"Coercion and the Hiddenness of God," pp. 35-37. Maimonides extends his
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explanation to cover Sihon's punishment as well. As proof of his approach, he
cites God's statement to Isaiah:
Make the heart of this people fat, make their ears heavy, and shut
their eyes; lest they see with their eyes, hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and [thus] will return [repent] and be healed. (Is.
6:10).
60. There is another difference between Albo and Maimonides, relating to
the purpose of the plagues. Maimonides seems to consider the later plagues to
be punishments for earlier misdeeds. He admits that we do not know why
God elects to punish Pharaoh in one particular way, viz., by preventing him
from repenting, rather than in some other way. This is simply the punishment
that God thought was most fitting and just. For Albo, all the later plagues are
attempts to give him an opportunity to repent properly (by seeing God's
power).
61. The objection sketched in this paragraph is developed by Isaac Arama
(1420-94) in his commentary Akedat Yitzhak, Exodus, ch. 36. An English adaptation of this chapter, omitting some details of Arama's critique of Maimonides, is
found in Eliyahu Munk, Aqaydat Yitzchaq (Jerusalem: Rubin Mass, 1986),347-60.
62. Arama also instances Ahab and Menashe (I Kings 16, 21; II Kings 21; II
Chronicles 33).
63. For a study that incorporates much of the relevant literature, see, Joram
Haber, Forgiveness (Savage, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991).
64. Quoted by Carl Reinhold Brakenhielm, Forgiveness, trans. Thor Hall
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1987), p. 11. Maimonides cannot handle this problem by modifying the nature of God's hardening so that it leaves Pharaoh
some small room to repent. The plain sense of Maimonides' words is that it is
unjust for Pharaoh to have his punishment mitigated, and so God must leave
no possibility open to him to repent. Maimonides does recognize a difference
between sins that make repentance hard and sins that cause repentance to be
prevented altogether; and at one point he implies that no sins are in the second
category (See Laws of Repentance, 4:6) But his language vis-a-vis Pharaoh suggests that notwithstanding those statements, Pharaoh is in that second category- he applies to Pharaoh's case the very term that he uses to describe the second category, viz., "monein et ha-teshuvah," "they prevent repentance."
Clearly Maimonides must deny that the verses in Ezekiel are absolute, and
with that he faces the charge that Pharaoh should be no different from any
other prospective penitent.There are midrashic passages to the effect that God
does not "call" to all people to repent (i. e., does not encourage everyone), but
that is different from saying that God does not allow certain people to repent.
65. Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik stresses this distinction in his discourses on
repentance. See Solovcitchik on Repentance, passim ..
66. The notion that the more one sins the more God will prevent him from
repenting also undermines an idea that Maimonides advances in the Guide of tiJe
Perplexed, to wit, that belief in repentance has social utility. In a section outlining
the purposes of the Torah's multifarious commandments, he places repentance
into a class which he describes as "the opinions without the belief in which the
existence of individuals professing a Law cannot be well ordered."
For an individual cannot but sin and err, either through ignorance-by professing an opinion or a moral quality that is not preferable in
truth- or else because he is overcome by desire or anger. If then the
individual believed that this fracture can never be remedied, he would
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persist in his error and sometimes perhaps disobey even more because of
the fact that no stratagem remains at his disposal. If, however, he
believes in repentance, he can correct himself and return to a better and
more perfect state than the one he was in before he sinned. (Guide of the
Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines [u. of Chicago, 1963], pt. 111, ch. 36, p. 540.)
Imagine now the impact on sinners of the knowledge that some fractures
cannot be remedied! Perhaps a Maimonidean can tum the tables, answering
that such knowledge would be useful since it would deter heinous crimes.
67. Furthermore, it is not unusual for Maimonides to present multiple, conflicting solutions in different works, so that a reading of the Laws of Repentance
which, say, conflicts with what he says in Eight Chapters, might nonetheless be
correct. The readings I propose now, however, conflict even with a previous
reading I gave for Laws of Repentance, chapter 6. They have nonetheless been
adopted by some interpreters.
68. Resh Lakish proffers this as an interpretation of Proverbs 3:34. His
statement is also found in Exodus Rabbah, 13:3.
69. The hierarchical strategy I discuss in "Hierarchical Theories of Freedom
and the Hardening of Hearts" is a variation of the strategy just considered. My
reservations about it are expressed there.
70. Cassuto, 56; d. Leibowitz, 149-60.
71. Guide of the Perplexed II:48; see the edition translated by Shlomo Pines
(Chicago, 1963), p. 410. It may surprise readers to learn that according to a
common scholarly opinion, Maimonides is a thoroughgoing naturalist, and not
merely a naturalist about hardening. On this interpretation, his treatments of
prophecy, providence, and even miracles have a naturalistic character. For discussion and references to the scholarly literature, see Jerome I. Gellman,
"Radical Responsibility in Maimonides' Thought," in The Thought of Moses
Maimonides, ed. 1. Robinson, L. Kaplan, and J. Bauer (Lewiston, N. Y.: Edwin
Mellen, 1991), 249-65; and my "Divine Intervention and Religious
Sensibilities," in Divine intervention and Miracles in Jewish Theology, ed. Dan
Cohn-Sherbok (Lewiston, N. Y: Edwin Mellen Press, 1996), 153-94.
The passage in Guide of the Perplexed II:48, no less than Cassuto's statement, is actually ambiguous as to the sense in which God is the remote cause:
did He just design nature, or does He directly initiate particular causal
sequences? The "naturalist" reading assumes the former.
72. Cassuto, 56.
73. See also Leibowitz, 149-60.
74. Nachum Sarna, The IPS Torah Commentary: Exodus (Philadelphia: Jewish
Publication Society, 1989), p. 23. Any naturalist reading of "God hardened" no
doubt will strike some readers as strained; but the expertise, literary sensitivity
and eminence of Cassuto and Sarna, as well as of Leibowitz (who also reads
hardening as a natural process, despite her criticisms of Cassuto), lead me to
defer to their understanding of the biblical locution.
75. Nicomacheall Ethics, III:5 (1114a). I have argued elsewhere that although
agents bear responsibility for acts done because of characters they formed,
such agents do not necessarily act freely. See "Irresistible Goodness and
Alternative Possibilities." My argument there is that we must distinguish
between the previous acts and the present one. For example, an addict acts
unfreely now when he takes drugs even if there were previous moments at
which he took drugs freely and those earlier choices shaped his present will. So
it may be preferable to hold that Pharaoh is responsible for his later acts even
though he does not perform them freely; and the naturalist position can and
maybe should maintain as much- adding, however, that, if Pharaoh lost his
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free will, that loss is his own responsibility.
76. Maimonides also puts forward a naturalist interpretation of most of the
twenty-four categories of people for whom repentance is difficult or withheld;
see chapter 4 of Laws of Repentance. In the Talmud, Ben Azzai points out that
people become drawn into patterns of behavior: "a good deed leads to another
good deed, a transgression to another transgression" (Avot 4:2). While his statement can be read supernaturalistically to mean that God provides further
opportunities for good or bad deeds based on a person's earlier choices, ben
Azzai might be referring to the power of habit.
77. Wolfson, Repercussions, 210-11.
78. Sarna writes on p. 36, in his comment to Ex. 7:3: "I utilize his stubbornness in order to demonstrate my active presence." This of course is not the
same as saying that God makes Pharaoh stubborn in order to demonstrate His
power. The account I suggest is designed to explain in what sense God
"makes" Pharaoh stubborn for the sake of multiplying His wonders. Cf.
Sarna's comment to Exodus 10:1 (p. 48), where again he does not interpret
God's words to imply that multiplication of wonders is the motive for hardening: "To the Egyptians, the multiplication of these 'signs' enhances the evidence pointing to God's power."
79. Wolfson, Repercussions, 208. See Abraham Ibn Daud, Emunah Ramah
(The Exalted Faith) II:6:2. See also Aquinas's discussion in Summa Theologica
IaIIae, Q79, a. 4.
80. See also Leibowitz, Aquinas.
81. See Gellman, "Radical Responsibility." Maimonides' view is a bit confusing as to whether betterment is parallel to naturalistic hardening. When
David prayed, "Uphold me with a willing spirit" (Psalms 51:4), he meant, "let
not my sins prevent me from repenting. Instead the choice may be in my hands
so that I may return, understand, and know, the way of truth. And so for all
similar verses." David is not asking that God interfere with his soul, but only,
in Gellman's words, that "his past sins not be allowed to prevent his own initiation of turning in the direction of God." But this construal of David's words
invites the question of why David's past sins would stand in the way if he is
really like a hardened agent. On the contrary his past right choices should
deterministically produce future right choices, just as a hardened agent's past
choices determine his present ones. Gellman's reference to "David's own initiation" suggests something other than a right choice produced by past right
ones.(See Gellman, "Radical Responsibility," 252-54; the quote about King
David's request is his translation of Laws of Repentance 6:4. 0. Saadya Gaon, p.
202.)
Eleonore Stump pointed out to me that if God directly assists people
not to sin, this would make the problem of evil look even more difficult. That is
another reason to construe betterment naturalistically, I think.
82. For a similar account of Maimonides' religious sensibility, see David
Hartman, Maimonides: Torah and Philosophic Quest (Philadelphia: Jewish
Publication Society, 1976).
83. Soloveitchik, as adapted by Peli in Soloveitchik on Repentance, 182. See
also Howard 1. Levine, "The Experience of Repentance: The Views of
Maimonides and William James," Tradition 1, 1 (Fall 1958):40-63. It is easy to
see that a naturalist account of betterment accords nicely with a naturalist
analysis of hardening. For if there is no divine assistance in the process of betterment, then psychological regularities and habit reign fully over the human
personality. If so, then not everyone can repent after all: some people are too
far gone to "return" even if they would want to. Belief in repentance must not
encourage the false hope that change for the better is always possible, because
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that attitude can produce moral laxity, the unacceptable attitude that the
Talmud calls "I will sin and then 1 will repent" (Mishnash Yoma 8:9).
84. I thank Eleonore Shlmp for her thorough comments on the penultimate
draft of this paper, and also David Widerker for commenting incisively on
much of the material when it was in another form.

